(Sent to Washington on November 5)

SUGGESTED DRAFT

My dear Mr. President:

I am undertaking to write directly to you because of my deep desire to assist in the accomplishment of your aims and of those of Secretary Dulles in the Far East, in order to fulfill the global security program which has lately been advanced by the achievements recorded in the European Theater.

Partial security is little better than no security at all. So long as Asia remains relatively open to further Communist advance, the security of the United States and of the entire Free World remains dangerously threatened. Our own situation in Korea has become less secure, and unless basic changes can be brought about, it is impossible to be optimistic about the future.

I wish at this time to express my basic agreement with the views expressed to me by your representatives that a solution of the security problem for Asia depends in significant part upon securing a satisfactory settlement of the relations between Korea and Japan. It is my hope that the time is approaching when this can be achieved, thereby opening the way to other developments that will enhance the security and stability of freedom in Asia.

As I am sure you understand fully, the relations between Korea and Japan comprise military, political and economic questions. The military questions are solved in part by the Mutual Security Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States, and by arrangements currently being worked out for the further enlargement of the Korean armed forces.

Politically, what we wish to achieve is a simple and unmistakable repudiation by Japan of her unlawful and threatening claims upon Korea. As you know, Japan has publicly repudiated the clause in the San Francisco Peace Treaty in which she accepted the transfer to Korean ownership of former Japanese assets in Korea. Instead, Japanese spokesmen have declared that Japan owns up to 85% of all Korean property. Similarly, Japan is asserting ownership of the Tokto Islands which were recognized by Japan as being Korean until after her assumption of a protectorate over Korea in 1905.

What we should like to have Japan do is to cancel the old Treaties of Protectorate and Annexation, thus affirming officially and finally any and all political claims upon Korean territory or sovereignty. With your able assistance, I believe this can be accomplished. After the repudiation by Japan of any claims over Korea, I believe it may be possible to proceed constructively toward an agreement upon a satisfactory fisheries line demarking the waters between the two nations. Our next aim would be to achieve a just settlement of our claims for the return of books, art treasures, ships and the gold reserve taken from Korea by Japan. Thereafter, we should be able to agree upon the restoration of normal

diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, thus providing an equitable basis for the discussion and free solution of other problems, such as the status of the Koreans resident in Japan.

Economic questions should be amenable to settlement as a spirit of mutual trust and confidence is developed in consonance with the reaching of agreements on the political questions. We are entirely agreeable to the negotiation of a new commercial agreement with Japan, which should provide for mutual advantages to both nations. It is impossible for either nation to exist in economic isolation. Since it is our aim to move as rapidly as possible into a viable economy in which we no longer will require large sums of American aid, we shall not hesitate to develope genuinely advantageous trade relations with Japan or any other non-Communist nation.

Finally, as a fruit of these other achievements, Korea would welcome the development of a three-nation pact including Korea, the United States and Japan, to oppose any foreign aggression in this part of the world, including any aggression launched by any of the three signatories.

It is only proper to reiterate what I have already said on occasion, namely, it is a mistake to attept to reconstitute Japan as the dominant power in Asia. If this should be done, not only would our security be undermined, but also there would be established a dangerous threat to the security of the rest of Asia and to the United States, itself. It is impossible to ignore the possibility that Japan in the future might find it advantageous to ally itself with the Communist aggressors. I believe the plan I have outlined in this letter provides a means for working toward a constructive democratic alliance and for preventing that threat of a possible Japannese-Red Chinese-Russian alliance.

It may be that my fundamental position on foreign policy is not always clearly understood. I hope this letter may clarify it for you and that the program I have suggested may prove to be a basis for peace-enforcing developments in Asia that will match what has been accomplished in Europe. The very grave difficulties of our situation may, on occasion, lead to seeming divergencies between your immediate goals and ours. But basically the necessities and sentiments of our two nations are deeply harmonious. I trust, Mr. President, that in a spirit of mutual good will and understanding we may carry forward our plans to success in solving the grievous problems which continue to afflict us.

With high respect, and with most cordial wishes for the success of your great goal of achieving a basis for lasting world peace, I am

Sincerely yours,

Syngman Rhee

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